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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondent Gavilan Operating Incorporated submits that there 
are no questions for review by this court which justify the 
granting of Petitioners request for a Writ of Certiorari• Gavilan 
disagrees with Petitioners claim as set forth under ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW in its Petition for Certiorari and submits 
that the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed and reconciled the 
holdings of this court in Mollerup v Storage Systems International, 
569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977) and United States v. Looslev 551 P.2d 506 
(Utah 1976) and correctly concluded that in redeeming the property 
Windriver was required to pay the amount of the bid price not the 
amount claimed as the debt. 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals1 decision in this case is Tech-Fluids 
Services, Inc. vs. Gavilan Operating, Inc. 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 
P.2d ( Utah 1990). 
JURISDICTION 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was filed February 16, 
1990. Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(5) and Rule 45 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure grant this Court discretion to review 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
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STATUTES INVOLVED 
Rule 69 (f)(1), (2), and (3) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(f) Redemption from sale. 
(1) Who May Redeem. Property sold subject to 
redemption, or any part sold separately, may 
be redeemed by the following persons or their 
successors in interest: (1) The judgment 
debtor; (2) a creditor having a lien by 
judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or 
on some share or part thereof, subsequent to 
that on which the property was sold. 
(2) Redemption—How made. At the time of 
redemption the person seeking the same may 
make payment of the amount required to the 
person from whom the property is being 
redeemed, or for him to the officer who made 
the sale, or his successor in office. At the 
same time the redemptioner must produce to the 
officer or person from whom he seeks to 
redeem, and serve with his notice to the 
officer: (1) a certified copy of the docket 
of the judgment under which he claims the 
right to redeem, or, if he redeems upon a 
mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the 
record thereof certified by the recorder; (2) 
an assignment properly acknowledged or proved, 
where the same is necessary to establish his 
claim; (3) an affidavit by himself or his 
agent showing the amount then actually due on 
the lien. 
(3) Time for Redemption, Amount to be Paid. The 
property may be redeemed from the purchaser 
within six months after the sale on paying the 
amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon 
in addition, together with the amount of any 
assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum 
for fire insurance and necessary maintenance, 
upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the 
property which the purchaser may have paid 
2 
thereon after the purchase, with interest on 
such amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a 
creditor having a lien prior to that of the 
person seeking redemption, other than the 
judgment under which said purchase was made, 
the amount of such lien, with interest. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
Tech Fluids brought this action to foreclose a $69,708.00 
mechanics lien on an oil and gas well. The trial court entered its 
order foreclosing the mechanics lien and directing the Sheriff of 
Duchesne County to sell the well. The Sheriff's Sale was held July 
2, 1987. Tech Fluid bid $4,000.00 and became the purchaser of the 
well at the sale. Wind River Resources Corporation as the assignee 
of Paiute Oil and Mining Corporation, the owner of the well, 
redeemed the property from the sale. Plaintiff brought an Order To 
Show Cause against Wind River challenging the redemption and 
requesting the court to order that the redemption by Wind River was 
invalid and that Plaintiff owned the well. 
After argument, the court upheld the redemption and ruled that 
Wind River was the owner of the well. 
There was no evidentiary hearing on the issues raised on 
appeal. The facts were stipulated by the parties. Wind River set 
forth in its Memorandum the facts it claimed were relevant and 
undisputed. (R.547-549) Plaintiff, in its Reply Memorandum, agreed 
with the statement of facts. (R.480) 
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Plaintiff appealed the Trial Courts decision on four grounds. 
The matter was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals in a unanimous decision ruled 
against Plaintiff on all four grounds. 
The real party now in interest is Gavilan Operating, Inc. 
Gavilan Operating, Inc. , acquired Wind River Resource Corporation's 
interest during the appeal and an order was signed by the Court of 
Appeals substituting Gavilan Operating, Inc., as the real party in 
interest. 
STATEMENT OP THE FACTS 
Paiute Oil and Mining Corporation (Paiute) was the owner of an 
oil and gas well known as Paiute-Walker 13-ND1 located in Duchesne 
County, Utah. Plaintiff claims to have provided services and 
materials to the well for which it was not paid. In November, 
1984, Plaintiff filed a mechanics lien on the well property 
claiming it was owed $69,708.00. When the claim was not paid 
Plaintiff instituted this action to foreclose the lien. (R.l) On 
December 18, 1985, Paiute filed a Petition for Bankruptcy in the 
United States Bankruptcy court for the District of Utah. (R.157) 
On May 18, 1987, Plaintiff obtained an order terminating the 
Automatic Stay and ordering the trustee to abandon its interest in 
well 13-ND1. (R.427) Plaintiff then immediately obtained from the 
District Court, an Order directing the Sheriff of Duchesne County 
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to post notice and conduct a public sale of the well property. 
(R.426, 435) The foreclosure sale was held on July 2, 1987. L.A. 
Dever, counsel for J. K. Foster, entered a bid of $4,000.00 as a 
credit bid in favor of Plaintiff. (R.443-444) 
Paiute let it be known that its redemption rights were for 
sale. Plaintiff demanded a Quitclaim Deed from Paiute which Paiute 
refused to give. (Stipulated Fact No. 7, R.548) Plaintiff 
obtained from the County Clerk a Writ of Execution dated December 
10, 1987. The Writ instructed the Sheriff of Duchesne County to 
execute on Paiute1s redemption rights. (R.446) That Writ was not 
served on Paiute but only posted on the well. (R.448, Stipulated 
Fact No. 9, R.549) The Sheriff scheduled the Sherifffs sale under 
the Writ for January 5, 1988. (R.449) 
On December 31, 1987, Paiute assigned to Wind River Resources 
Corporation its redemption rights on the property involved. 
(R.462, ) On January 1, 1988, Wind River Resources Corporation 
delivered to the Sheriff's office of Duchesne County a copy of the 
Assignment of Rights of Redemption, an acknowledged Notice of 
Redemption setting forth the calculation of the redemption price, 
the property to be redeemed and the basis for its right to redeem, 
(R.463) and a cashier's check in the amount of $4,310.00 (R.457) 
The Sheriff issued a Sheriff's Redemption Certificate to Wind 
River. (R.465) 
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Plaintiff then had an Order to Show Cause issued requiring 
Wind River to appear before the court in Duchesne, Utah on the 19th 
day of January, 1988 to show cause, if any, why a Sheriff's Deed 
should not issue to the Plaintiff, why the Assignment of the 
Redemption Rights from Paiute to Wind River should not be found 
null and void, or alternatively why the Sheriff of Duchesne County 
should not issue a Sheriff's Certificate as a result of Plaintiff's 
claimed sale of July 2, 1987. (R.474) 
The parties appeared before the court on January 19, 1988. 
Both parties argued their positions and submitted legal memoranda. 
The court then entered its ruling denying the relief requested in 
the order to show cause and concluding the Plaintiff had no right, 
title, or interest in the subject well. (R.569, ) 
On February 10, 1988, Plaintiff filed a motion claiming that 
Wind River Resources Corporation was required to pay the entire 
amount of Plaintiff's lien of $89,000.00 to properly redeem. That 
motion was denied by the court on February 29, 1988. (R.611) The 
court then signed its Conclusions of Law and Order. (R.612, 616) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PLAINTIFF»S PETITION PROVIDES NO REASON 
UNDER RULE 46 OP THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE BY 
WHICH THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT A WRIT OF CERTIORARI. 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that 
a Writ of Certiorari is granted only when there are "special and 
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important reasons". Those reasons are set forth in Rule 46. None 
of those reasons apply to this case. 
Plaintiff in seeking a Writ of Certiorari urges that there is 
a conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals in this 
case and the case of Mollerup vs. Storage Systems International 569 
P.2d 1121 (Utah 1977). In making that argument Plaintiff ignores 
the reasoning and analysis of Judge Orme in writing for the 
unanimous panel from the Court of Appeals as he distinguished this 
case from Mollerup. The Court of Appeals found that the case of 
United States v. Loosley 551 P. 2d 506 (Utah 1976) was better 
precedent for the instant case stating that "The requirements at 
issue in this case are identical to those in Loosley." 128 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 43. The reasoning of the Court of Appeals is sound and 
there is no reason to grant the Writ of Certiorari petitioned for 
here. 
POINT II THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE TEST OF LOOSLEY WAS MET IN THIS 
CASE. 
This Court in Loosley concluded that the procedural aspects of 
redemption did not prejudice the purchaser at the foreclosure sale 
and therefore substantial compliance by the redeemer was 
sufficient. The court then found the same to be true in this case 
and applied the Loosley rule in the case before the court. See 
also Gesa Federal Credit Union vs. Mutual Life Insurance Company 
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105 Wash.2d 248, 713 P.2d 728, 731-33 (1986), Household Finance 
Company vs. Bacon 58 Or. App. 267, 648 P.2d 421, 423 (1982). 
Furthermore, in this particular case there was more than 
substantial compliance with the procedural provisions of Rule 69. 
Plaintiff has argued that the assignment of redemption was not 
properly notarized because the seal was not ascertainable from the 
face of the document. The only document the Plaintiff has ever 
produced is a copy. Copies generally do not on their face show the 
imprint of the seal. The original assignment is apparently still 
in the possession of either the Sheriff or Wind River. Plaintiff 
argues there is no affidavit setting forth the amount owed. The 
document entitled Notice of Redemption does set forth the amount 
owed and is sworn to under oath, and meets the requirements of 
being an affidavit. 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that a copy of the judgment docket 
was not submitted to the Sheriff. Plaintiff fails to point out to 
the Court that it did not follow proper procedural rules and did 
not have any judgment entered or docketed. Plaintiff should not be 
allowed to complain about failure to produce a record which 
Plaintiff has failed to properly file with the Court. 
POINT III. WIND RIVER PAID THE SHERIFF THE CORRECT 
AMOUNT WHEN IT REDEEMED THE PROPERTY FROM THE SHERIFFS 
FORECLOSURE SALE. 
Wind River, at the time it redeemed the property, paid the 
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purchase price of $4,000.00, interest at the rate of 6 percent and 
costs as required by Rule 69(f)(3). Plaintiff claims that Wind 
River should have paid to the Sheriff the entire amount of the debt 
represented by its Mechanics Lien. This argument was considered 
and rejected by the Court of Appeals. Justice Orme appropriately 
pointed out that the argument by Plaintiff and the case relied on 
by Plaintiff are contrary to the clear language of Rule 69(f) (3). 
To illustrate the error of Plaintiff's claim one only needs to 
apply the names of the parties to the statutory provision in 
question and it becomes clear that the provision relied on by the 
Plaintiff has no application in this case. The provision in 
question states: 
[I]f the purchaser (Plaintiff) is also a creditor having 
a lien prior to that of the person seeking redemption 
(Wind River) other than the judgment under which said 
purchase was made, the amount of such Lien with interest. 
In this case, Plaintiff does not have a lien on the property "prior 
to that of the person seeking redemption" i.e. Wind River. The 
property was redeemed By Wind River as an assignee of Paiute. 
Plaintiff does not have another lien on the property in addition to 
the one that has been foreclosed. This particular provision of 
Rule 69(f) (3) has no application to the facts of this case. It is 
to be applied in cases in which there are numerous liens on the 
property by both the redeeming party and the purchaser. 
As pointed out by Justice Orem, " Tech-Fluid does not claim to 
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have any lien on the well other than the one which permitted the 
original foreclosure sale. Under the express language of the 
statute, therefore, is only entitled to the amount of the purchase 
bid plus 6 percent interest." 128 Utah Adv. Rep. at 43. 
CONCLUSION 
Gavilan respectfully requests that the Court deny the petition 
for Writ of Certiorari. 
DATED this ( g day of April, 1990. 
McKEACHNIB^/ALLRED & BUNNELL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
By: 
QLar^B. Alfred 
By: jkol/^LeA^^ 
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APPENDIX 
Court of Appeals decision 
Conclusions of Law dated February 29, 1988, by District Judge 
Dennis L. Draney in the Eighth Judicial District Court of 
Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
Order dated March 8, 1988, by District Judge Dennis L. Draney 
in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, State 
of Utah. 
11 
40 Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc. CODB^ CO 128 Utah Adv. RCP, 40 Provo.uuh 
the McCaffcrys should have acquired on their own 
automobile. See id 
3. See Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-301 to-412 
(1988). However, McCaffery does not contend he 
actually complied with these provisions. 
4. We note that even if we were to find that §31A-
22-309(6) was available to McCaffery, this court 
would not be the correct forum in which to pursue 
his claim. The statute specifies arbitration as the 
proper recourse. 
Cite as 
128 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TECH-FLUID SERVICES, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
GAVILAN OPERATING, INC., Paiute Oil & 
Mining Corp., et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 890067-CA 
FILED: February 16, 1990 
Seventh District, Duchesne County 
Honorable Dennis L. Draney 
ATTORNEYS: 
Harry H. Souvall and Robert M. McRae, 
Vernal, for Appellant 
Clark B. Allred and Gayle F. McKeachnie, 
Vernal, for Respondents 
Before Judges Bullpck,1 Jackson, and Orme. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellant Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. 
appeals from an adverse ruling concerning the 
redemption of. property it purchased at a 
sheriffs sale. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Paiute Oil and Mining Corporation, the 
predecessor of respondent Gavilan Operating, 
Inc., had an ownership interest in an oil and 
gas well located in Duchesne County. Appel-
lant Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. supplied serv-
ices and materials to the well for which it was 
not paid. In November 1984, it filed a mech-
anics' lien on the well claiming that $69,708 
was owing. In January 1985, Tech-Fluid 
commenced an action to foreclose its lien 
naming Paiute and several other entities as 
defendants. 
In December 1985, Paiute filed a voluntary 
reorganization petition under chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. A trustee was subsequently 
appointed. In February 1986, the state district 
court entered a judgment of foreclosure as 
against all of the defendants in the lien action 
except Paiute. Because of the pending bankr-
uptcy, the district court specifically declined to 
adjudicate the claim as between Paiute and 
Tech-Fluid. 
In May 1987, Tech-Fluid obtained an 
order lifting the automatic stay as it applied to 
the lien action and ordering the trustee to 
abandon her interest in the well. Thereafter, 
Tech-Fluid obtained an order from the dist-
rict court directing the sale of Paiute's interest 
in the well. No judgment of foreclosure 
against Paiute was ever entered or docketed 
prior to the court-ordered sale, a procedure 
which, while unorthodox, was never objected 
to by any party. A sheriffs sale of the well 
was held on July 2, 1987. Tech-Fluid was the 
only bidder at the sale and purchased the 
property with a $4,000 credit bid. 
In the fall of 1987, Tech-Fluid discovered 
that Paiute intended to assign its redemption 
right. Tech-Fluid demanded a quitclaim 
deed, but Paiute refused. On December 14, 
1987, Tech-Fluid obtained from the county 
clerk a writ of execution instructing the sheriff 
to execute on Paiute's redemption right. A 
public sale of the redemption right was set for 
January 5,1988. 
On December 31, 1987, Paiute assigned its 
redemption right to Wind River Resources 
Corporation. On January 1, 1988, the final 
day of the redemption period, Wind River 
exercised the right of redemption by delivering 
to the sheriffs office of Duchesne County 1) 
an inadequately notarized copy of the assign-
ment of Paiute's right of redemption; 2) an 
acknowledged notice of redemption setting 
forth the calculation of the redemption 
amount, the property to be redeemed, and the 
basis for its right to redeem; and 3) a cashier's 
check in the amount of $4,310. The sheriff 
issued a sheriffs redemption certificate to 
Wind River. 
On January 5 and 6, Tech-Fluid attempted 
to proceed with the scheduled execution sale 
and purchase the redemption right. However, 
the sheriff would not accept Tech-Fluid's bid 
until the district court determined whether a 
redemption right could be subject to execu-
tion. 
On January 8, Tech-Fluid obtained an 
order directing the sheriff to show cause why 
he should not issue his deed to Tech-Fluid 
because of an invalid redemption by Wind 
River. The district court subsequently held a 
hearing on the order to show cause and ruled 
that 1) the assignment was valid, 2) the right 
of redemption could not be executed upon, 3) 
Wind River was entitled to redemption 
because it substantially complied with the 
statutory requirements for redemption, and 4) 
Tech-Fluid had no further interest in the 
well. Tech-Fluid filed a further motion, cla-
iming that Wind River was required to pay not 
only the $4,000 but the entire amount of the 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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lien. The motion was denied and the court 
signed its conclusions of law and order. Tech-
Fluid brought this appeal. 
On appeal, Tech-Fluid raises several arg-
uments. First, it argues that, although the 
trustee abandoned the well, she did not 
abandon the right to redeem the well in the 
event of foreclosure. If this were true, the 
assignment from Paiute to Wind River would 
be invalid because Paiute would have had no 
interest in the redemption right, which would 
have been held, until its expiration, by the 
trustee. Second, Tech-Fluid argues that the 
court erred in holding that it could not execute 
on the redemption right. Third, it argues that 
the redemption was unsuccessful because Wind 
River failed to strictly comply with the rede-
mption statute. Finally, Tech-Fluid argues 
that Wind River was required to pay the entire 
amount of the lien before it could redeem the 
property. 
ABANDONMENT OF THE RIGHT OF 
REDEMPTION 
Tech-Fluid argues that the trustee never 
abandoned her right to redeem the well2 and 
therefore Paiute had no right which it could 
assign to Wind River. On the other hand, 
Gavilan, as successor to Paiute, argues that 
when the trustee abandoned her interest in the 
well, she necessarily abandoned any right to 
redeem which might arise in the event of for-
eclosure. The trial court heard arguments from 
counsel at the order to show cause hearing. 
Subsequent to the hearing, the parties submi-
tted memoranda to support their positions. 
The court ruled that the trustee had aband-
oned the well long before the redemption right 
arose. The evidence and the law support the 
district court's conclusion and therefore we 
affirm. 
Tech-Fluid concedes that a right of rede-
mption is a property interest.3 Moreover, it is 
clear that upon the filing of the bankruptcy 
proceeding, the entire "bundle of rights" 
Paiute had in the well, including its right to 
redeem in the event of any sale subject to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69, see note 3, supra, became 
part of the bankruptcy estate.4 However, we 
do not agree that the trustee had to explicitly 
abandon her right of redemption for it to 
revert to the debtor,5 any more than she had 
to explicitly abandon other rights of owner-
ship, such as the right to collect royalties or 
the right to explore and develop or even the 
right of possession. 
According to the bankruptcy code, "the 
court may order the trustee to abandon any 
property of the estate that is burdensome to 
the estate or that is of inconsequential value 
and benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C. §554(b) 
(1989). Courts and commentators have reco-
gnized that once abandoned, "the property 
stands as if no bankruptcy had been filed and 
the debtor enjoys the same claim to it and 
. Gavilan Operating, Inc.
 AA 
interest in it as he held previous to the filing 
of bankruptcy." In re Cruseturner, 8 Bankr. 
581, 591 (D. Utah 1981) (emphasis added). 
"Thus, abandonment constitutes a divestiture] 
of all interests in property that were property 
of the estate." 4 W. Collier, Collier on Ban-
kruptcy 1554.02(21 (15th ed. 1989) (emphasis 
added). 
The trial court's conclusion in this case is 
consistent with Cruseturner and Collier. We 
see no reason why the right to redeem should 
be treated differently than any other property 
interest that the trustee has in the property 
prior to abandonment. On the contrary, it 
would be anomalous to view the right of red-
emption as an independent property interest 
which stayed with the trustee when she aban-
doned the property to which it pertained. The 
right to redeem is such that it can only be 
exercised after property has been sold at a 
foreclosure sale, and only those with an inte-
rest in the property at the time of the sale (or 
their successors in interest) have a right to 
redeem. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(1). See also 
Layton v. Thayne, 133 F.2d 287, 289 (10th 
Cir. 1943), cert, denied, 323 U.S. 786 (1944). 
It is inconsistent to suggest that a trustee, 
having abandoned property and consequently 
bring divested of all interest therein, would 
still retain a right to redeem, at least absent 
some expressed and unambiguous intent by the 
trustee to retain that right.* We hold, there-
fore, that "divestiture of all interests in the 
property" includes divestiture of the trustee's 
right to redeem. 
Tech-Fluid points to no compelling auth-
ority inconsistent with the trial court's and 
our conclusion. On the other hand, although 
our attention has been drawn to no case dec-
iding the precise issue before us, the Fourth 
Circuit has at least stated in dicta that when 
the trustee abandons her interest in property 
of the estate, "the property and the right of 
redemption remains in, or reverts to, the 
bankrupt." In re Webb, 54 F.2d 1065, 1067 
(4th Cir. 1932). 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the 
redemption right belonged to Paiute after the 
well was abandoned, and that Paiute could 
properly assign that right to Wind River. 
COMPLIANCE WITH REDEMPTION 
STATUTE 
The district court concluded that Wind 
River had only to comply substantially, rather 
than strictly, with the requirements of Rule 
69(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The court also concluded that Wind River had 
substantially complied with those requirem-
ents. We agree on both scores. 
Rule 69(0(2) provides that, at the time of 
redemption, 
the redemptioner must produce to 
the officer or person from whom he 
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seeks to redeem, and serve with his 
notice to the officer: (1) a certified 
copy of the docket of the judgment 
under which he claims the right to 
redeem, or, if he redeems upon a 
mortgage or other lien, a memora-
ndum of the record thereof certified 
by the recorder; (2) an assignment, 
properly acknowledged or proved 
where the same is necessary to est-
ablish his claim; (3) an affidavit by 
himself or his agent showing the 
amount then actually due on the 
lien. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(0(2). 
Tech-Fluid argues that the trial court erred 
when it applied a substantial compliance test 
to determine whether Wind River had properly 
redeemed. Tech-Fluid cites Mollerup v. 
Storage Sys. Int'l, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), 
and argues that strict compliance with the 
statutory requirements was necessary. In 
Mollerup, the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
"[t]he right of redemption has long been rec-
ognized as a substantive right to be exercised 
in strict accord with statute^ terms." Id. at 
1124. 
Gavilan, on the other hand, argues that 
substantial compliance with the requirements 
of Rule 69(0(2) was sufficient under United 
States v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976). 
In Loosley, the Court stated that 
statutes dealing with redemption are 
regarded as remedial in character 
and should be given liberal constr-
uction and application to permit a 
property owner who can pay his 
debts to do so, and thus make his 
creditor whole, and save his prop-
erty. Therefore, if a debtor, acting 
in good faith, has substantially 
complied with the procedural req-
uirements of the rule in such a 
manner that the lender mortgagee is 
not injured or adversely affected, 
and is getting what he is entitled to, 
the law will not aid in depriving the 
mortgagor of his property for mere 
falling short of exact compliance 
with technicalities. 
Id. at 508 (emphasis added). 
Mollerup and Loosley, though seemingly 
inconsistent, are readily reconciled. Very 
simply, not all redemption provisions are 
alike. Courts, in evaluating the necessity for 
strict compliance in these kinds of cases, focus 
upon the nature of the statutory requirements 
and the likelihood of prejudice. If failure to 
adhere to the requirements will affect a subs-
tantive right of one of the parties and possibly 
prejudice that party, then courts require strict 
compliance. On the other hand, if the requir-
ements are merely procedural and will not 
prejudice one of the parties, substantial com-
pliance is sufficient. 
The Washington Supreme Court addressed 
these distinctions directly in Gesa Fed. Credit 
Union v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 
248, 713 P.2d 728, 731-33 (1986) (en banc). 
The Gesa court recognized that the Washin-
gton redemption statute involved "a number 
of provisions, some which confer a statutory 
right ... and some of which establish a proc-
edure by which that right is perfected .... 'A 
statute is remedial when it relates to practice, 
procedure, or remedies and does not affect a 
substantive or vested right." 713 P.2d at 732 
(quoting Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wash. 2d 
170, 685 P.2d 1074, 1081 (1984)). The Gesa 
court went on to hold that the technical failure 
involved in that case was harmless because the 
failure did not affect a substantive right and 
appellant was not prejudiced. Id. at 732-33. See 
also Household Fin. Corp. v. Bacon, 58 
Or. App. 267, 648 P.2d 421, 423 (1982) 
(technical inconsistencies with statutory requ-
irements did not adversely affect rights of 
purchaser). 
Our Supreme Court in Mollerup was cons-
truing Rule 69(0(3) which sets a time limit of 
six months in which redemption must be 
made. This provision clearly affects a substa-
ntive right of the purchaser. All right, title and 
interest in the property do not vest in the 
purchaser at a foreclosure sale until the rede-
mption period has expired. Local Realty Co. 
v. Lindquist, 96 Utah 297, 85 P.2d 770, 772 
(1938). "[T]he interest of the purchaser is 
[merely] an equitable interest, subject to be 
lost or cancelled or taken away by the debtor 
or any redemptioner or their assigns upon 
payment of the sale price with interest." 85 
P.2d at 772. If there is no redemption within 
the prescribed period, the purchaser is then 
entitled to a conveyance of the property. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 69(0(5). To allow redemption 
beyond the six-month period inevitably 
compromises and prejudices the purchaser's 
interest. Consequently, the Court concluded 
that absent some significant facts to "move the 
conscience" of the Court, it would not extend 
the redemption period. Mollerup, 569 P.2d at 
1124. 
Loosley, like the case before us, involved 
Rule 69(0(2). A brief recitation of the facts in 
Loosley is helpful. The Loosleys failed to pay 
a government loan. The government then 
foreclosed on a property interest of the Loo-
sleys. At a foreclosure sale, the Griffiths 
purchased the property interest. The Loosleys 
then assigned their right of redemption to the 
Hammons, who further assigned the right to 
Basic Investment, Inc. One day prior to the six-
month redemption period, Basic served a 
notice of redemption on the Griffiths' atto-
rney, accompanied with a check for the 
correct redemption amount. They did not 
serve any of the documents specified in Rule 
69(0(2). Eight days after the tender, the Gri-
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
CODE* CO 
Provo, Utah 
Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc. 
1H Utifa Afr. Rro, 40 43 
ffiths returned the check and rejected the 
tender based upon Basic's failure to comply 
with Rule 69(0(2). 
The trial court in Loosley concluded that 
because the Griffiths had failed to adhere to 
the requirements of Rule 69(0(2), their rede-
mption failed. On appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed. It recognized that the failure 
to comply with the technical requirements of 
Rule 69(f)(2) had no adverse effects on the 
Griffiths. 551 P.2d at 508. It then held that 
since the assignments were proper, the Griff-
iths had tendered the correct amount within 
the prescribed time, and the Loosleys had 
failed to object, the redemption was good. Id. 
Based upon the authority discussed above, 
and in particular Loosley, we affirm that 
substantial compliance is the proper test under 
Rule 69(0(2). Moreover, because the Court 
found substantial compliance in Loosley, we 
are obliged to find it in this case. Tech-
Fluid's position is even weaker than the Gri-
ffiths' position was in Loosley. Wind River 
not only tendered the correct amount within 
the redemption period but also tendered some 
proof of the assignment between Paiute and 
Wind River and a document entitled "Notice 
of Redemption" giving additional facts about 
its entitlement to redeem. Although Wind 
River could surely have done more to comply 
with the requirements of Rule 69(0(2),7 it 
complied more fully than did the defendants 
in Loosley. Additionally, as in Loosley, Tech-
Fluid did not challenge the validity of the 
tender until several days after the tender and 
after the redemption period had run. 
The requirements at issue in this case are 
identical to those in Loosley. They are proce-
dural in nature and do not affect any substa-
ntive rights of the purchaser.8 Tech-Fluid has 
failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the 
failure to strictly adhere to the requirements of 
Rule 69(0(2). Consequently, we affirm the 
district court's holding that Wind River sub-
stantially complied with the redemption pro-
visions and that such compliance is all that is 
necessary. 
EXECUTION ON REDEMPTION RIGHT 
Having concluded that Wind River other-
wise properly redeemed, we now address 
whether Tech-Fluid could execute upon 
Paiute's redemption right. We hold that it 
could not. 
We need not address the more general issue 
of whether a judgment creditor could ever 
execute upon the judgment debtor's right of 
redemption because Tech-Fluid failed to 
obtain a foreclosure judgment upon which a 
post-foreclosure sale deficiency judgment 
could be based and absent such judgment, 
there was nothing on which any execution 
could be premised. When Tech-Fluid rece-
ived relief from the automatic stay regarding 
the well, it immediately proceeded to obtain 
an order from the district court to sell 
Paiute's interest in the well. In its haste, Tech-
Fluid did not first obtain a foreclosure judg-
ment determining the correct amount owing. 
Under a normal foreclosure scenario,* the 
judgment creditor first obtains a foreclosure 
judgment determining the correct amount due 
and owning. Then, property subject to the 
judgment is sold at a foreclosure sale. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(a)-(e). If the proceeds 
from the sale are inadequate to pay the entire 
amount determined in the foreclosure judg-
ment, "[tjhe clerk must, as a mere ministerial 
duty, enter a deficiency judgment against the 
(debtor]." First Nat'l Bank v. Haymond, 89 
Utah 151, 57 P.2d 1401, 1405 (1936). Without 
an initial foreclosure judgment, the clerk has 
no basis upon which to calculate a deficiency. 
Thus, the clerk cannot enter a deficiency 
judgment and absent such a judgment he or 
she cannot properly issue a writ of execution. 
Consequently, the clerk in this case improperly 
issued the writ of execution. 
Tech-Fluid should not now be heard to 
complain. It chose its own course of action by 
failing to first obtain a foreclosure judgment. 
We hold that Tech-Fluid was not entitled to 
execute upon Paiute's redemption right.1* 
AMOUNT OF REDEMPTION 
Finally, Tech-Fluid argues that Wind River 
was obligated to pay not only the amount of 
the bid but the entire amount of the alleged 
debt. Rule 69(0(3) provides in pertinent part: 
The property may be redeemed 
from the purchaser ... on paying 
the amount of his purchase with 6 
percent thereon in addition ... and, 
if the purchaser is also a creditor 
having a lien prior to that of the 
person seeking redemption, other 
than the judgment under which said 
purchase was made, the amount of 
such lien, with interest. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(0(3) (emphasis added). 
Tech-Fluid does not claim to have had any 
lien on the well other than the one which 
permitted the original foreclosure sale. Under 
the express language of the statute, therefore, 
it was only entitled to the amount of the 
purchase bid plus six percent interest. See 
Madsen, Equitable Considerations of Mort-
gage Foreclosure and Redemption in Utah: A 
Need for Remedial Legislation, 1976 Utah L. 
Rev. 327, 343-44. 
Once again, Tech-Fluid is bound by its 
choices, including the decision to bid only 
$4,000 on the well. As the only bidder at the 
saJe, Tech-Fluid established the value of the 
well for redemption purposes and placed itself 
in the predicament it now finds itself. See 
Kries v. Allen Carpet, Inc., 146 Ariz. 348, 706 
P.2d 360, 363-64 (1985) (en banc); Johnson 
v., Zahn, 380 111. 320, 44 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1942). 
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According to Rule 69(0(3), Wind River was 
only obligated to pay what Tech Fluid paid 
plus the specified interest. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the rulings of the district court 
and hold that: 1) The trustee abandoned her 
right of redemption when she abandoned the 
well; 2) Wind River substantially complied 
with the technical requirements of Rule 
69(0(2) and therefore properly redeemed; 3) 
having failed to obtain a foreclosure judg-
ment, Tech-Fluid could not execute on the 
redemption right; and 4) Wind River was only 
obligated under Rule 69(0(3) to tender the 
amount of the purchase plus interest. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
J. Robert Bullock, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting 
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3-24(10) (1989). 
2. It is noteworthy that the trustee never claimed she 
had somehow retained the right to redeem Paiute's 
interest in the well. On the contrary, we are prese-
nted with her affidavit stating she always considered 
the redemption right abandoned right along with the 
well. However, that affidavit was not submitted to 
the trial court, is introduced for the first time on 
appeal, and, therefore, is not part of the record 
properly before us. Accordingly, it plays no part in 
our decision. 
3. A right of redemption is created in Utah by Rule 
69(0 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which 
provides, in pertinent part, that "[property sold 
subject to redemption, or any part sold separately, 
may be redeemed by the following persons or their 
successors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor ....* 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(0(1). "Successors in interest" 
clearly include assignees. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
69(0(2X2). 
4. When a debtor files for bankruptcy, an estate is 
created which includes "all legal or equitable inter-
ests of the debtor in property as of the commence-
ment of the case.' 11 U.S.C. §541 (1979). Accor-
ding to Collier, *[a]n equity of redemption comes 
within the scope of 'all legal or equitable interests 
of the debtor in property.** 4 W. Collier, Collier on 
Bankruptcy 1541.07[3] (15th ed. 1989) (quoting 11 
U.S.C. §541 (1979)). See also Layton v. Layton, 44 
Utah 349,140 P.2d 759,761 (1943). 
5. Tech-Fluid relies upon §554(d) of the bankru-
ptcy code which states that "property of the estate 
that is not abandoned ... and that is not administ-
ered ... remains property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. 
§554(d)(1989). 
6. We need not decide whether the trustee could 
have specifically retained the right to redeem the 
property even while abandoning the property. The 
trustee in this case chose not to attempt to retain 
that right, see note 2, supra, and in the absence of 
any indication to that effect, the right to redeem 
automatically parsed to Paiute upon abandonment 
of the well. 
7. Wind River could have complied more fully in 
several respects. Although there was no judgment 
docketed. Wind River could have submitted a copy 
of the court order directing sale of the well. More-
over, there are no facts in the record to suggest an 
excuse for the inadequate notarization of the assig-
nment. Finally, Wind River could surely have sub* 
mined an affidavit stating the alleged amount due 
on the lien. 
S. The procedural rules of 69(0(2) were likely 
created for the benefit and protection of the sheriff, 
so that he may be guided in what to require to make 
certain that redemption is in order. See, e.g.. Hou-
sehold Fm. Corp. v. Bacon, 58 Or. App. 267, 648 
P.2d 421,423 (1982). 
9. The mechanics' lien statute specifically provides 
that mechanics1 liens are foreclosed in the same 
manner, and subject to the same right of redemp-
tion, as in the case of mortgages. See Utah Code 
Ann. §38-1-15 (1988). 
10. Having based our conclusion on Tech-Fluid's 
failure to obtain a foreclosure judgment, we do not 
mean to suggest that Tech-Fluid would have pre-
vailed had this fact been otherwise. There is appar-
ently little case law addressing the issue of whether a 
mortgage creditor may execute on the redemption 
right of the mortgage debtor. However, Gavilan 
directs our attention to Johnson v. Zahn, 380 111. 
320, 44 N.E.2d 15 (1942). In Johnson, the Illinois 
Supreme Court held that a lien did not attach to the 
judgment debtor's equity of redemption arising 
from the judgment creditor's deficiency judgment. 
44N.E.2datl9. 
Cite as 
128 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Garth YOUD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Richard B. JOHNSON; and Howard, Lewis & 
Peterson, a partnership, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 880431-CA 
FILED: February 21,1990 
Fourth District, Utah County 
Honorable George E. Bailif 
ATTORNEYS: 
Roy G. Haslam and Elizabeth S. Whitney, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Stephen B. Nebeker, Thomas L. Kay and Paul 
D. Newman, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondents 
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and 
Jackson. 
ORDER 
This court, having considered the respon-
dent's petition for rehearing and appellant's 
reply, in which both parties stipulated that the 
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ADDENDUM NO. 5 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Wind River 
Resources Corporation 
3 63 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 34078 
Telephone; (301) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TECH-FLUID SERVICE, I N C . , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP. , ] 
SAM O I L , I N C . , WALKER ENERGY ] 
GROUP, CHEVRON USA, I N C . , ] 
a n d DUCHESNE COUNTY, a b o d y ; 
p o l i t i c , ; 
D e f e n d a n t s . ) 
i CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
C i v i l No. 87 -CV-13D 
The above captioned matter came before the Court January 19, 
1988, pursuant to Tech-Fluid Services, inc.'s, (Tech-Fluid) Order 
to Show Cause. Tech-Fluid was represented by its attorneys, 
Harry Souvall and L.A. Dever. Wind River Resources Corporation 
(Wind River) was represented by its attorney, Clark B. Allred. 
The principal issue presented by the Order to Show Cause was 
whether Tech-Fluid or Wind River had acquired Paiute Oil & Mining 
Corporation's (Paiute) interest in a certain oil and gas well. 
Tech-Fluid advanced three arguments claiming that the Trustee in 
Bankruptcyr not Paiute, was the holder of the redemption rights; 
that Tech-Fluid had executed on the redemption rights and that 
i.. 
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Wind River had failed to comply with Rule 69 when it redeemed the 
property. The facts upon which the Court was to decide these 
issues was stipulated to, at oral argument and then listed in 
Wind River's Memorandum. The Court having heard argument on 
January 19, 1988; the parties having submitted Memoranda on the 
three issues advanced by Tech-Fluids and the Court being fully 
advised, enters the following Conclusions of Law. 
1. The Trustee in the Paiute bankruptcy abandoned the 
subject property long before there were any redemption rights and 
that abandonment included the abandonment of any redemption 
rights. The bankruptcy estate did not have any interest in those 
redemption rights and therefore, the assignment of the redemption 
rights to Wind River was valid. 
2. Redemption rights are not property which can be 
executed upon. To allow such an action would destroy any 
protection provided by the statutes which created redemption 
rights and the policies and purposes of redemption rights. 
Therefore, Tech-Fluid's attempt to execute on the redemption 
rights was of no effect. 
3. Wind River's redemption was in substantial compliance 
with Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Tech-Fluid 
received everything to which it was entitled and has not shown 
that it was prejudiced by Wind River's failure to provide a copy 
of the judgment docket, particularly where, in this case, there 
2 
was no judgment docketed. 
DATED this^Mday of February, 1988. 
Dennis L. Draney ~7 
District Judge U 
Z-
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CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Wind River 
Resources Corporation 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TECH-FLUID SERVICE, INC., ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP., j 
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY ] 
GROUP, CHEVRON USA, INC., ] 
and DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body ; 
politic, 
Defendants. ] 
i ORDER 
Civil No. 87-CV-13D 
The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Ruling, Plaintiff's Motion 
dated February 10, 1988, and Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed 
Conclusions of Law and Order. The Court having reviewed the 
Motions and Memoranda, filed by the parties, hereby finds that 
the Court has already ruled on the sufficiency of compliance with 
Rule 69. The Court further finds that the redeeming party need 
not pay the balance due on the lien. The lien of the Plaintiff 
has been extinguished. The Plaintiff, when it had its 
foreclosure, had the opportunity to bid a sufficient amount to 
protect its interest. The Court furthermore, finds that 
Plaintiff's interpretation of Rule 69 is not correct, but rather 
the interpretation propounded by Wind River is proper. Based on 
these findings the Court hereby enters the following Order: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Ruling and 
Plaintiff's Motion dated February 10, 1988 are hereby denied. 
2. The parties, at oral argument, stipulated to the facts, 
which stipulated facts are also set forth in the Memoranda. The 
Court, therefore, denies Plaintiff's objections and has signed 
the Conclusions of Law and Order submitted by Wind River. 
DATED this day of March, 1988. 
Dennis L. Draney 
District Judge 
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